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Germany. Through English eyes I saw the war as an attack by Germany upon France and Belgium, with Russia almost entirely invisible; through German eyes I saw the war as an attack by Russia upon Germany, with almost all the other countries outside the horizon. In England I traveled in the train with Belgian refugees fleeing before the German invasion, while in Germany I traveled in the train with German refugees fleeing before the Russian invasion along hundreds of miles of their eastern frontier. The balance of power, which I saw in England as a defensive alliance against the aggressive intentions of Germany, became there a plot compounded of Russian determination to break up Austria, the French "revanche," and the English desire to smash the German fleet and German commerce. In English public opinion the war lord stood as the new Napoleon, determined to bring all the world into subjection; in Germany I saw him as the representative of a united people, defending themselves against a ring of enemies who had long been planning to divide up the Empire, but had been forced by the assassination in Sarajevo to embark on their course of dismemberment a little earlier than they had intended.

A few things remained right side up. In Germany I found among the leaders of the four million Social Democrats a hatred of imperialism and militarism more bitter and more intense than in England or in America. (It was strange to talk with men after reading the reports that they had been shot!) "But militarism is the worst possible way in which to fight militarism," they said; "it has forced us to make this choice; either we must temporarily join forces with militarism or we must stand by and see our country overrun by the Russians. Prussianism is bad enough, but we prefer it to Russianism." The Social Democratic party had almost attained to power. It secured 34 per cent of the votes at the last election, in 1912, and has been gaining at the rate of more than 1 per cent of the total votes a year for the past twenty years. In co-operation with the next most radical party, the Progressive People's party, they were looking forward to victory and the control of the government at the next election, in 1917. What will be the results of the use of the crude instrument of military force no one can tell; but from what I saw in Germany I should say that if Germany is crushed and humiliated in this war the overthrow of Prussianism and militarism in Germany will be set back for half a century. Prussianism must be destroyed, but the only people who can destroy it are the German people.

I heard everywhere in Germany, as I have been hearing everywhere in England and from America, "As far as is humanly possible, this must be the last war." From all the scores of Germans with whom I talked—business men, leaders in religion and education—I received the same reply to my question in regard to the German demands in case of German victory. "In case of victory we will not ask for one foot of territory in Europe" was the almost unanimous reply. "Alsace-Lorraine and Prussian Poland have been a lesson for us, and it is against German principles to have a hostile population within our borders. We are fighting a war of defense and our chief concern is to secure the integrity of our country." In England and all the outside world I saw Austria and Germany looked upon as the aggressors and their policies as the sole cause of the war. In Germany

I found that Russia and England were considered the aggressors and the cause of the war, Russia because of her intrigue with Servia to break up the Austrian Empire, and England because without the assurance of her support Russia would never have embarked upon her career of aggression. I believe that if delegates from all the countries concerned could be gathered together each one would declare: "We have no desire for aggression; we are fighting only in self-defense." A wise man presiding over such a conference might say: "This is a war of mutual fear. None of you know what you are fighting for; you are as far apart as the poles from understanding each other; return to your governments; tell them to call back their armies into their own countries, and order the soldiers to lay down their arms and go back to their families and their workshops."

During the past three years I have been in all the European countries engaged in the struggle, and I have found militarists and imperialists in all of them. Each has its own national type of Bernhardi's, Treitschke's, and advocates of Nietzsche's philosophy. But, I thank God, I have found in each of them also men who have recognized that the whole philosophy of force is false; that militarism must be destroyed, and that all social progress in the future depends upon the union of the forces of democracy and progress for the solution of the international problem, and the establishment of those ideas which will give the secure basis for a permanent peace. For the present need these men are the salt of the earth. Any solution of the present conflict which does not depend upon an intellectual revolution and which does not radically alter the present relations of the States of Europe must necessarily be a temporary one. I have found an increasing number of men in Germany, as in all the other countries, who realize this. Call it Utopia if you will, they say, but the only alternative to another forty-four years of frenzied armament competition leading to another Armageddon is some kind of a concert or federation of Europe leading to the federation of the world.

AUGUST 24—SEPTEMBER 4.

### Deterioration from War.

The rapidity of the deterioration in moral standards under conditions of war has seldom been more strikingly shown than here and now.

On July 29, a week before England entered upon the war, Sir Edward Grey was moved to indignation by the refusal of the German Chancellor to pledge himself, in the discussion of England's relations to France, that Germany would not in any of the contingencies of war lay hands on the French colonies. In less than a week after the actual outbreak of war France and England united in the seizure of the German colony in West Africa.

The loudest and most constant assurance in the London press has been that there is no hostility here to Germany and the German people, but that the war is solely against the German autocracy and militarism. A week after war was declared a piece by Strauss was replaced on the program of the first promenade concert of the season by something of Tchaikovsky's; the usual Wagner concert was replaced the next day by a Franco-

Russian program, and it was stated that all the works of living German and Austrian composers would be banished for the future. This was to propitiate popular sentiment. "The patriotic feelings of the enormous audience," we were assured, had to be considered, and any German music might provoke such manifestations as would embarrass the police. A writer in one of the newspapers ventures the ironical comment that "it would be interesting to know whether it is also high treason in Germany now to be caught reading Shakespeare and Milton?"

On August 5, this was a war on England's part for the neutrality of Belgium, the rights of small nations, and the sanctity of treaties. The suggestion of any sordid or selfish consideration was anathema. A fortnight later, Belgian neutrality claims less space in the newspapers than the capture of German markets. "World Trade War" is the caption for a column in a leading Liberal newspaper this morning, and essentially the same appears in the other papers. "Millions to be Won," "Plans for Conquest of German Markets," "British Traders' Opportunity to Capture Commerce"—such are the bristling headlines. "No such golden chance has ever been offered to British industry and commerce as is afforded by the conditions arising from the present European war," proclaims the British Empire Industrial League, and it gloats over the chances for Britain's capture of the £532,000,000 annual volume of export trade till yesterday in the hands of "our most unscrupulous competitors." One writer urges the annihilation not only of Germany's navy, but of her entire mercantile fleet as well. If this were done, "England would have such a booming trade as we have never before dreamed of." Even the Colonial Secretary and the Foreign Secretary and the board of trade are co-operating officially to collect and circulate the data which will rouse English traders to the good fortune offered them by Germany's misfortune. "The complete paralysis of Germany's export trade which has followed the sweeping of the seas by the British navy," says the *Daily News*, the organ of Liberalism, "has presented our traders with a wonderful opportunity, and they are grimly alive to the situation."

One cannot help wondering how all this will read in "selfish, envious, and bigoted" Berlin. Will she "grimly" venture the suspicion that the eloquent and mighty altruism of a fortnight ago was not the dominant thing in the British compound? She could, like everybody else, make too sweeping deductions from things like these. They do not represent in any sense the majority or dominant sentiment of the English public today. But, as we see in every war, these are the sentiments which rapidly develop as the war itself develops, until public opinion in the warring nations becomes inebriate and selfishness and passion entirely usurp the throne.

LONDON, August 20.

### Book Reviews.

**THE BALKAN WARS. 1912-1913.** The Stafford Little lectures at Princeton University for 1914. By Jacob Gould Schurman. Princeton University Press, 1914. 144 pages. Price, \$1.00 net.

President Schurman is unusually well qualified to re-

port on the attitude of the governments concerned in the wars, because of the official position he held at Athens during that period. The first section of the book treats of Turkey and the Balkan States, and contains a historical account of Turkey's rise and subsequent decline in power, the story of the oppression of the Slavonic population of the Balkan peninsula, the Greek ecclesiastical domination of the Slavs, the causes of the first Balkan war, and the reasons which led Greece to cast her lot with Servia and Bulgaria instead of allying herself with Turkey. The second part is concerned with the war between the allies, their rival ambitions and animosities, and the other causes which contributed to the outbreak of hostilities between them. Dr. Schurman lays emphasis on the conciliatory spirit of the Greeks, especially of the Prime Minister and the King, and maintains that the war of the allies was not provoked by Greece. The treatise is clear, concise, and accurate, and deserves to be read by all who wish to understand the situation that led to the two Balkan wars.

**THE LAST SHOT.** By Frederick Palmer. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York: 1914. 517 pages. Price, \$1.35 net; postage extra.

This story by Frederick Palmer, who for twenty years as war correspondent has known more of war than most men, is somewhat difficult to interpret. The book rings with the author's own personal experiences. As a writer of battles, sieges, victories, and defeats he is as supreme in his idealism as in the actual war which he has depicted. The first impression of the reader is that the story is artificial, and indeed continues to be. The conflicts in the story make one as disgusted with the whole irrational business of war as if reading of actual battles being fought. The defeated general could not face the disgrace, and took his own life—"The Last Shot"—giving the title to the story. The author closes with a complicated exposition of the uselessness and ruinousness of annexation of territory, of indemnities, etc. He allows the use of armaments only as an international police force, and clearly points out that the only solution is to make humanity feel such a revolt against the awful war curse that men will refuse to leave their homes, and will demand that the settlement of disputes be left to statesmen.

**ASIA AT THE DOOR.** By K. K. Kawakami. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1914. 269 pages. Price, \$1.50 net.

The list of excellent treatises on the vital question of American-Japanese relations is rapidly growing. To his former volume on "American-Japanese Relations" Mr. Kawakami has now added another scholarly discussion of the Japanese question in Continental United States, Hawaii, and Canada. The author has been so long in America that he writes with a complete understanding of the viewpoint of this country as well as of his own. He endeavors, by presentation of actual conditions, to correct the groundless fears and misapprehensions that exist in the minds of many. He writes in a friendly and fair spirit. His command of the English language is remarkable, his style facile and charming, while at the same time logical, judicial, and convincing. Some of the titles of the chapters are most suggestive: "The Meeting of Two Worlds," "Mutual